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such a finding would be sufficient to
validate the entry. [d. at 280l.
The Court rejected Rodriguez's argument that permitting entry based on the
"reasonable belief' of common authority vicariously waives a defendant's
fourth amendment rights. [d. The Court,
in rejecting this contention, de-emphasized Rodriguez's waiver of his fourth
amendment rights and highlighted the
reasonableness of the officers' belief in
Fischer's authority to consent. [d. at
2800. The Court stated that "at issue in a
claim where apparent consent is raised
is not whether the right to be free of
searches has been waived, but whether
the right to be free of unreasonable
searches has been violated." [d. at 2801
(emphasis original). Noting that the
fourth amendment is the source from
which Rodriguez's trial rights regarding
the exclusionary rule derives, the Court
reasoned that to violate a defendant's
rights against the admission of exclusionary evidence, the fourth amendment
itself must first be violated. [d. In analyzing whether a fourth amendment violation occurred, the Court reasoned that
the fourth amendment itself does not
assure that a government search of a
home will not occur, but assures only
that an "unreasonable" search will not
occur. [d. at 2799.
As the Court stated in Schenckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
"[n]othing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement
suggests that it ought to be extended to
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures." Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799 ( 1990) ( quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 241 (1973)). The Rodriguez Court,
therefore, reasoned that the fourth
amendment only guaranteed Rodriguez
protection against "unreasonable"
governmental searches, not freedom
from searches without his consent.
Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens. The dissent contended that a
search pursuant to an officer's reasonable but erroneous belief that a third
party had authority to consent differs
from valid third party authority to consent to governmental entry. [d. at 2802
(Marshall, )., dissenting). The dissent

reasoned that glvmg a third party
authority to consent to entry limits an
owner's ability to challenge the reasonableness of a search because allowing another person access to or control
of property reduces an owner's expectation of privacy. [d. at 2802 (Marshall,).,
dissenting). The dissent believed that
where no actual relinquishment of access
or control occurs, and a third party lacks
actual authority to consent, there cannot be an exception to the warrant
requirement because there would remain an expectation of privacy. [d. The
dissent reasoned that subjecting a person to a warrantless search without
authorized consent or exigency would
erode the fourth amendment's protection of a home from "unreasonable"
governmental intrusion. [d. at 2807
(Marshall,)., dissenting).
Rodriguez is significant in that it
broadens the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement for
entry into an individual's home. The
practical effect of the decision is that if a
third party convinces law enforcement
officials of his apparent authority to consent to entry, no warrant for entry will
be required and thus, the homeowner's
expectation of privacy will be diminished. In addition, Rodriguez illustrates
the present Court's reluctance to restrict governmental action in drug related
cases.
- Daryl D. Jones

In re Moore: DEBTORS' INTERESTS
IN ERISA-QUALIFIED PROFITSHARING AND PENSION PLAN
BEYOND THE REACH OF
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in [n re Moore, 907
F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) reconciled
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
with those of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.c.
§1001 et seq. (1976) (ERISA). The
court found that debtors' interests in an
ERISA-qualified profit-sharing and pension plan were not subject to turnover
to the trustee in bankrutpcy, because
ERISA constitutes applicable non-bankruptcylaw.
A number of employees of Springs
Industries who participated in their
company's comprehensive retirement
program became involved in Chapter 7

bankruptcy proceedings. The program's
Profit-Sharing and Pension Plan and
Trust and Retirement Plan and Trust
contained anti-assignment provisions
which prohibited the employees from
alienating their interests. The antiassignment provisions were necessary
to qualify the employees' interests in the
plans as ERISA funds and maintain their
tax-exempt status. Under the plans, distributions were to be made to beneficiaries "only upon retirement, disability
or termination of service." Moore, 907
F.2d at 1477. The debtors had received
no distributions from the plans at the
time they petitioned for bankruptcy and
were not eligible to do so in the near
future.
The trustee in bankruptcy sought to
compel the Profit-Sharing and Pension
Plan and Trust administrator to tum
over the employees' interests to the
bankruptcy estates. The trustee argued
that the interests in the plan were not
subject to restrictions on transfer, because the plan was not a spendthrift
trust under South Carolina law. Without
addressing whether the plan was a spendthrift trust under South Carolina law, the
bankruptcy court determined that since
the plan was ERISA-qualified, the debtors' interests in the plan were nonalienable and thus excludable from the
bankruptcyestates. 1hetrusteein bankruptcy

appealed the decision. [d.
The United States Court ofAppeals for
the Fourth Circuit noted that under the
Bankruptcy Code, the property of a
bankrupt's estate consists of" all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of
the case." Moore, 907 F.2dat 1477 (citing 11 U.S.c. §541(a)(1)). However,
the Code excludes the debtors' interests
in certain trusts from their bankruptcy
estates by recognizing restrictions on
transfers of such interests. Specifically,
"[ a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that
is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." [d. (citing 11 U.S.c.
§541( c )(2)). Thus, if ERISA constitutes
applicable nonbankruptcy law, and the
debtors' interests are enforceable under
ERISA, the trustee would be precluded
from reaching those interests.
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
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section 541(c)(2) did not encompass
the restrictions on alienation of plan
benefits in 29 U.S.c. § 1056( d)( 1).
Rather, the trustee argued that the term
referred "only to plans with transfer restrictions enforceable under state spendthrift trust law." Moore, 907 F.2d at
1477. The court of appeals rejected the
trustee's overly restrictive interpretation
of section 541 ( c ) (2) and held that the
term was not limited to state spendthrift
trust law. Id.
First, the court found nothing in the
plain language of section 541 ( c)( 2) to
suggest that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" refers exclusively to
state law. The court stated that the language means exactly what it says, thus
encompassing all laws, state and federal,
under which a restriction on transfer
can be enforced. Id
Furthermore, the court found that the
identical language in other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code had been determined to apply to federal as well as state
law. For example, in In re Ahead By a
Length, Inc., lOO B.R 157 (Banke.,
S.D.N.Y. 1989), the bankruptcy court
found "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
within the provisions of 11 U.S.c.
§ 108( a) to include, inter alia, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act. The court thus concluded that
it would be "incongruous to give the
same phrase in Section 541(c)(2) a
narrower construction than the identical phrase other parts of the Bankruptcy
Code, particularly since the disparate
sections of the Bankruptcy Code were
enacted together in a single comprehensive statute." Moore, 907 F.2d at
1478. The court further concluded that,
had Congress intended the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to encompass only state law, it would have stated
so explicitly, as it had in other sections
oftheCode.Id. (citing 11 US.c. §522(b)
(1) & (2)).
Acknowledging the trustee's argument that several circuit courts have
determined the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2)
to refer only to state spendthrift trust
laws, the court distinguished those decisions as involving self-settled trusts
where the settlor was the beneficiary
and had powers to amend or terminate
the trust without penalty. Id In contrast,
the beneficiaries of the Springs Indus-

tries' plan could not control the trust,
could not borrow against it, and could
not amend the trust.
The court also rejected the trustee's
appeal to the legislative history of section 541(c)(2), finding such an approach inappropriate, since tl:te language
of the statute was clear. Id. at 1478-79.
Furthermore, the court noted that even
if a review of the legislative history were
relevant, it would be inconclusive. The
court found that Congress' repeated
emphasis on state spendthrift trust law
in the legislative reports accompanying
section 541(c)(2) indicated merely its
intentions to include state spendthrift
law within the restrictions of transfer
enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcylaw." Id. at 1479. Thus,foundthe
court, Congress was treating interests in
plans containing valid spendthrift clauses
in the same way as prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, when such
interests were not property of the bankrupt's estate. Id. The court reiterated,
"[ n ]othing in the legislative history indicates ... that Congress meant 'applicable
nonbankruptcy law' to refer exclusively
to state spendthrift trust law." Id.
Having concluded that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" may include
federal law, the court went on to consider the issue of whether ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
so that the debtors' interests in the
ERISA-qualified plan were properly excluded from the estates under section
541(c)(2). The court found that the
primary purpose of ERISA was to secure
employees' retirement income so that a
worker promised a retirement benefit
would actually receive it. Id. ERISA
secures pension benefits primarily by
restricting the assignment and alienation of those benefits. Id. at 1480. Because these non-alienability provisions
deny general creditors, as well as plan
participants, access to vested benefits,
the court concluded that ERISA "constitutes 'applicable nonbankruptcy law'
under which restrictions on the transfer
of pension interests may be enforced."
Id. Thus, the court concluded, "'[u]nder
the plain and simple language of section
541 ( c)( 2), if the ERISA anti-alienation
provisions are enforceable against general creditors, they are enforceable
against the bankruptcy trustee. '" Id.

at 1478 (quotingIn re Threewitt, 24 B.R
927,929 (D. Kan. 1982)).
In finding ERISA to constitute applicable nonbankruptcy law within the
meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ensured that neither the vagaries of state
laws, nor the particularities of state
spendthrift trust law would continue to
threaten the security of employee retirement benefits, thus furthering ERISA's
purpose of uniform treatment of pension benefits across the country.
- MaryJo Murphy

Mandel tJ. O'Hara: GOVERNOR
ENJOYS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
BASED ON APPROVAL OR VETO
OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS.
In Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103,
576 A.2d 766 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a governor could not be held liable for damages
in tort based upon his veto or approval
of legislation. The absolute immunity is
of the same type which members of the
General Assembly enjoy when voting for
or against legislative bills and applies
even if corrupt motives underlie the
exercise of power.
During 1971, Marlboro racetrack
made an agreement to buy eighteen racing days from another track which conducted horse racing with parimutuel
betting. The General Assembly approved
the transfer which subsequently was
vetoed by Governor Mandel. As a result,
James F. O'Hara, III and Michael P.
O'Hara sold their stock in Marlboro.
Thereafter, the General Assembly overrode the veto and Marlboro merged
with another entity that conducted horse
racing with parimutuel betting.
The O'Haras brought suit against the
governor and others, based on a theory
of conspiracy. They contended that by
vetoing the bill, Governor Mandel planned to depress the value of the Marlboro
stock, acquire the stock, then restore its
value by inducing the General Assembly
to override the veto. At trial, the governor's motion for su~ary judgment
based on absolute immunity was denied.
Governor Mandel appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland where he
was granted a stay. The court of appeals
granted certiorari before determination
on the merits to determine if a Governor
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